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Perceptual simulations are unconscious and automatic, whereas perceptual imagery is conscious 
and deliberate, but it is unclear how easily one can transfer perceptual information from 
unconscious to conscious awareness.  We investigated whether it is possible to be aware of what 
one is mentally representing; that is, whether it is possible to consciously examine the contents of 
a perceptual simulation without information being lost.  Studies 1-2 found that people cannot 
accurately evaluate the perceptual content of a representation unless attention is explicitly drawn 
to each modality individually. In particular, when asked to consider sensory experience as a 
whole, modality-specific auditory, gustatory and haptic information is neglected, and olfactory 
and visual information distorted.  Moreover, information loss is greatest for perceptually 
complex, multimodal simulations. Study 3 examined if such information loss leads to behavioral 
consequences by examining performance during lexical decision, a task whose semantic effects 
emerge from automatic access to the full potential of unconscious perceptual simulation.  Results 
showed that modality-specific perceptual strength consistently outperformed modality-general 
sensory experience ratings in predicting latency and accuracy, which confirms that the effects of 
Studies 1-2 are indeed due to information being lost in the transfer to conscious awareness. 
These findings suggest that people indeed have difficulty in transferring perceptual information 
from unconscious simulation to conscious imagery.  People cannot be aware of the full contents 
of a perceptual simulation because the act of bringing it to awareness leads to systematic loss of 
information. 
 
Keywords: perceptual simulation, imagery, modality-specific, perceptual strength, sensory 
experience ratings, lexical decision  
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Do we know what we’re simulating? Information loss on transferring unconscious perceptual 
simulation to conscious imagery 
Grounded accounts of semantics hold that conceptual representations comprise 
simulations. The neural activation that arises during perceptual (and motor, affective, etc.) 
experience is partially captured and then replayed – or simulated – during language 
comprehension, problem solving, and other cognitive tasks that involve conceptual access 
(Barsalou, 1999; Connell & Lynott, 2014b; Glenberg, 1997; Wilson, 2002; Vigliocco, Meteyard, 
Andrews, & Kousta, 2009; Zwaan, 2004).  Perceptual simulations are unconscious and 
automatic, in contrast to mental imagery which is conscious and deliberate.  Indeed, mental 
imagery may be considered a special case of perceptual simulation, where the simulation is 
consciously inspected and manipulated in working memory (e.g., Barsalou, 2009; Moulton & 
Kosslyn, 2009). However, it is unclear whether perceptual simulations can move easily from 
unconscious to conscious representation.  Are people capable of reliably reporting imagery from 
perceptual simulations?  Or, in other words, can people be aware of everything they are 
simulating? 
There are reasons to think that the transfer from unconscious simulation to conscious 
imagery might create some difficulties.  Firstly, working memory is necessarily limited and may 
not be able to contain the full extent of a perceptual simulation.  By limited working memory, we 
do not mean a “magic number” of seven (Miller, 1956) or four (Cowan, 2010) items, but rather 
refer to a finite-capacity buffer that allows information from long-term memory to be integrated 
and manipulated (Baddeley, 2000; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995).  A situation model created during 
the reading of a novel, for example, may comprise a detailed perceptual simulation of the 
objects, entities, events, and goals inherent to the plot (Zwaan, 2004).  The contents of working 
memory at a given point in time, though, are likely to be limited to objects that are close and 
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visible rather than distant or occluded (Horton & Rapp, 2002; Morrow, Greenspan & Bower, 
1987), events that are ongoing rather than completed (Zwaan, 1996), and so on.  In other words, 
some information in a perceptual simulation is likely to be lost when brought to working 
memory as imagery for conscious inspection.  Secondly, people do not find it equally easy to 
deliberately generate imagery across all modalities (Connell & Lynott, 2012).  In particular, 
people tend to have relatively little practice in imagining what something sounds, tastes, or feels 
like, which leads auditory, gustatory and haptic information to be ignored or misinterpreted when 
rating the ease of generating imagery (i.e., imageability).  It is possible that similar information 
loss may come into play any time that people attempt to transfer a conceptual representation 
from automatic, unconscious simulation to conscious awareness, whereby the auditory, gustatory 
and haptic modalities are likely to be disfavoured. 
One way to differentiate between conscious and unconscious representation is to ask 
people to evaluate the representation in some way.  The task of rating the extent of perceptual 
information in a concept such as chair requires participants to mentally represent the meaning of 
the word (i.e., unconscious simulation of perceptual, motor, situational, etc. experience of chairs) 
and to evaluate those aspects that relate to sensory experience (i.e., conscious imagery of how 
chairs look, feel, etc.).  A number of different semantic variables have attempted to tap into the 
perceptual basis of conceptual representation, including concreteness and imageability (Paivio, 
Yuille & Madigan, 1968), perceptual strength (Lynott & Connell, 2009, 2013), and sensory 
experience ratings (Juhasz & Yap, 2013).  Of these, only the latter two explicitly examine the 
extent of perceptual information in concepts; concreteness ratings reflect separate decision 
criteria that are largely unrelated to perceptual information (Connell & Lynott, 2012), and 
imageability ratings reflect the ease of generating perceptual imagery rather than the extent of 
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perceptual information therein.   
Lynott and Connell’s (2009, 2013) modality-specific ratings of perceptual strength asked 
people to rate the extent to which they experience a given concept (e.g., chair) by seeing, 
hearing, smelling, tasting, or feeling through touch, where each modality is rated separately on a 
scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (greatly).  Perceptual strength in the dominant modality (i.e., the 
maximum rating across all five modalities) is an effective predictor of lexical decision and 
naming performance, subsuming the effects of both concreteness and imageability ratings 
(Connell & Lynott, 2012). Juhasz and Yap’s (2013) sensory experience ratings (SER) asked 
people to rate the degree of sensory experience evoked by a word, on a scale from 1 (no sensory 
experience) to 7 (strong sensory experience), where sensory experience was defined as an actual 
sensation (taste, touch, sight, sound, or smell) experienced by reading the word.  Like perceptual 
strength, SER is a predictor of lexical decision and naming times above and beyond imageability 
(Juhasz, Yap, Dicke, Taylor, & Gullick, 2011; Juhasz & Yap, 2013).1  While these two measures 
may appear superficially similar, they differ in one key respect: perceptual strength asks people 
to rate five separate modalities in turn (from which the dominant modality can then be extracted), 
whereas SER asks people to provide a single rating that is intended to span all five modalities.  
                                                            
1  Although SER is a significant predictor in a model that already includes 
imageability, SER cannot be said to subsume imageability because the reverse was not tested 
(i.e., whether imageability is still a meaningful predictor in a model that already includes SER).  
Perceptual strength subsumes imageability because both orders of variable entry were tested by 
Connell and Lynott (2012), who showed not only that perceptual strength predicts lexical 
decision and naming variance in the presence of imageability, but that imageability predicts no 
variance in the presence of perceptual strength. 
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This difference, between modality-specific versus overall consideration of perceptual experience 
when evaluating a simulation for extent of perceptual information, is the focus of the following 
studies. 
In the present paper, we investigated whether people can ever be consciously aware of 
the full content of their perceptual simulations, or whether the act of conscious inspection means 
that some information will inevitably be lost. The perceptual simulation that comprises the 
meaning of a word, sentence, or longer discourse is unconscious and automatic: perceptual 
information is implicitly retrieved but is not necessarily at a level of activation that is available to 
conscious awareness.  However, deliberately inspecting some element of this simulation – such 
as when evaluating the extent of its perceptual content – involves consciously attending to it and 
devoting working memory resources to its inspection.  As such, conscious imagery of a concept 
places more demands on working memory than does unconscious simulation of the same 
concept.  In three studies, we examined whether the transfer of perceptual information from 
unconscious simulation to conscious imagery involves the loss of some of this information.  In 
Study 1, we tested whether bringing a perceptual simulation to conscious awareness involves 
information loss by comparing two measures of a concept's perceptual content – perceptual 
strength ratings (for which participants attempted to generate conscious imagery for a single 
modality of perceptual information at a time) and sensory experience ratings (for which 
participants attempted to generate conscious imagery for all of a concept's perceptual 
information at once).  In Study 2, we examined whether information loss could be explained by 
people prioritising the most dominant perceptual modalities in a particular simulation when 
generating conscious imagery.  Finally, in Study 3, we investigated whether the observed 
information loss in Studies 1-2 really resulted from the transfer of perceptual information from 
INFORMATION LOSS FROM SIMULATION TO IMAGERY 7 
 
 
unconscious to conscious awareness by testing which variable – perceptual strength or SER – 
best predicts performance in lexical decision, a task in which semantic access is automatic and 
implicit. 
Study 1: Separate Perceptual Modalities 
We aimed to establish in this first study whether the transfer from unconscious perceptual 
simulation to conscious imagery in working memory involves information loss (i.e., neglect or 
distortion of perceptual information).  Perceptual simulations do not have to be detailed 
representations; they can be as sketchy or incomplete as will satisfice current goals (Barsalou, 
1999; Louwerse & Connell, 2011).  However, when a task involves processing a single word, the 
unconscious perceptual simulation of its meaning is relatively rich in detail (Connell & Lynott, 
in press), and includes perceptual information across multiple modalities (Connell & Lynott, 
2014a), affective information of positive/negative valence (Kuperman, Estes, Brysbaert, & 
Warringer, 2014), and motor information about object interactions (Siakaluk, Pexman, Aguilera, 
Owen, & Sears, 2008).  Moreover, since no concept is truly aperceptual (i.e., completely devoid 
of perceptual experience: Connell & Lynott, 2012), grounded simulations are critical to 
representing both concrete and abstract concepts (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Vigliocco 
et al., 2009).  If the limited capacity of working memory means that information loss is 
inevitable when asked to evaluate a potentially large and complex perceptual simulation, then 
people will be unable to provide a single rating that accurately reflects the full range of 
multimodal sensory experience involved in a perceptual simulation, unless attention is explicitly 
drawn to each modality individually.  That is, perceptual strength and SER will diverge, with 
people neglecting information from some or all modalities (i.e., no relationship between 
particular modality-specific ratings of perceptual strength and SER), and/or distorting it (i.e., 
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modality-specific relationships appearing and disappearing from one end of the SER scale to the 
other). Following Connell and Lynott’s (2012) findings regarding imageability, we hypothesized 
that the auditory, gustatory and haptic modalities may be most susceptible to such information 
loss because people find it difficult to generate conscious imagery in these modalities. 
On the other hand, if perceptual simulations can be easily transferred to conscious 
awareness without information loss, then people should be able to rate reliably the extent to 
which a word evokes a perceptual experience, regardless of the modalities involved.  In this 
instance, perceptual strength and SER would be closely related, with people taking all modalities 
into account (i.e., positive relationships between SER and perceptual strength ratings for all five 
modalities of visual, haptic, olfactory, gustatory, and auditory strength), and doing so 
consistently (i.e., same modality-specific relationships at low and high ends of SER scale). There 
would be no requirement for all modalities to contribute equally to SER, just for all modalities to 
contribute positively across the scale. 
Method 
Materials.  A total set of 554 words were collated, representing the intersection between 
all available norms of perceptual strength (Lynott & Connell, 2009, 2013; plus additional 
unpublished items) and SER (Juhasz et al., 2011; Juhasz  Yap, 2013). Sample items are given in 
Table 1 along with ratings for each variable, highlighting where SER and perceptual strength are 
consistent (i.e., SER and perceptual strength agree on the extent of perceptual information in a 
concept) or inconsistent (i.e., SER and perceptual strength disagree on whether a concept has a 
high or low extent of perceptual information). 
Design and analysis.  There were two phases of analysis.  First, we ran linear regression 
analysis across the full scale, with SER as the dependent variable and perceptual strength for five 
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modalities (auditory, gustatory, haptic, olfactory, visual) as independent predictors.  Table 2 
shows zero-order correlations.  Second, in order to examine the consistency of the relationship 
between SER and individual modalities, we split the SER scale at the sample median2 (2.91) and 
re-ran the regression analyses separately for low-SER (N = 276) and high-SER (N = 278) items.  
We report effect sizes throughout as partial correlations per predictor, with 95% confidence 
intervals bootstrapped over 1000 samples from a pseudo-random seed.  See supplementary 
materials for detailed statistics of zero-order correlations and model coefficients.  
Results and Discussion 
Analysis of the full scale showed that perceptual strength in five modalities accounted for 
a relatively small amount of the variance in SER: R2 = .131, adjusted R2 = .123, F(5, 548) = 
16.45, p < .0001.  Such a level of fit is relatively poor for two semantic norms that are ostensibly 
measuring the same thing (i.e., perceptual experience underlying a conceptual representation) 
and points towards a distinct difference in the information being rated. Examining the individual 
contribution of each modality confirmed that the perceptual experience rated in SER diverged 
from that rated in modality-specific perceptual strength (see Table 3): only visual and olfactory 
experience contributed to SER fit, whereas auditory, gustatory, and haptic experience had no 
                                                            
2  We chose to split the scale at its median (2.91) rather than its midpoint (4.00) 
because a midpoint split would have led to very unequal sample sizes in the low-SER (N = 448) 
and high-SER (N = 106) subsamples, meaning the relative power of the predictors could not have 
been fairly compared.  Moreover, in the full set of available SER norms (N = 5857: Juhasz & 
Yap, 2013), both the median (2.82) and modal response (3.00) are also below the scale midpoint, 
which suggests that our choice of scale partition is close to the central tendency of the SER 
distribution. 
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relationship with SER.  Collinearity was not a problem: all VIFs < 2.2.  This pattern is similar to 
that reported by Connell and Lynott (2012) for imageability ratings, where auditory, gustatory 
and haptic strength failed to contribute to the ease of generating imagery, which overall suggests 
that perceptual information from these modalities is difficult to examine unless attention is 
explicitly drawn to them individually. 
Analysis of the split scale also produced inconsistencies between low- and high-SER in 
terms of their modality-specific relationships.  Low SER was not reliably related to perceptual 
strength, R2 = .033, adjusted R2 = .015, F(5, 270) = 1.83, p = .107, with no modality acting as a 
significant predictor (all ps > 0.1, see Figure 1 for partial correlations).  High SER was better 
predicted by modality-specific perceptual strength, R2 = .077, adjusted R2 = .060, F(5, 272) = 
4.53, p = .001, but only olfactory strength contributed reliably, partial r = .195, β = 0.269, t(272) 
= 3.27, p = .001 (all other modality ps > .2, see Figure 1).  As such, it appears that olfactory 
experience is subject to some distortion when a perceptual simulation is transferred to conscious 
awareness, with increasing olfactory strength having different effects at low and high ends of the 
SER scale.  Furthermore, the absence of visual strength as a predictor of either low- or high-
SER, when it was present as a predictor of the full scale, is notable.  If one examines the visual 
strength ratings of sample words in Table 1, it is clear that many items with low SER can be 
strongly visual; indeed, the mean visual strength for low-SER items (visual M = 3.42 out of 5) is 
high, albeit slightly lower than for high-SER items (visual M = 3.78).  This small but meaningful 
difference in visual strength between low- and high-SER words allowed it to emerge as an 
overall predictor across the full scale, but the relationship was insufficiently consistent when 
examining low- and high-SER separately. 
In summary, it appears that some information is lost when a perceptual simulation 
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transfers to conscious imagery.  In line with predictions, auditory, gustatory and haptic 
modalities are neglected when people attempt to inspect the perceptual content of a word's 
referent concept.  For instance, strongly perceptual words such as rhyme (auditory strength 4.68 
out of 5), mild (gustatory strength 3.62), and pat (haptic strength 4.29) all received quite a low 
SER (less than 2 out of 7), suggesting that these perceptual aspects of the simulation were not 
evident to participants when they attempted to rate the sensory experience evoked by each word.  
That is, low SER does not necessarily mean low in perceptual content.   
Moreover, information from the modalities that did contribute to SER – visual and 
olfactory – is subject to distortion. Visual experience was interpreted inconsistently, as evinced 
by the mean high visual strength at both ends of the scale.  Both bead and cliff are strongly visual 
(strength 4.13 and 4.23, respectively), for instance, but only cliff evoked a noticeably sensory 
experience and hence received a high SER (5.00, compared to 1.45 for bead).  Increasing visual 
strength does not increase SER by very much at the low end of the scale (i.e., relatively shallow 
slope, standardized β = 0.098), and by even less at the high end of the scale (i.e., almost flat 
slope, standardized β = 0.019).  The differing visual slopes for high and low SER reflect 
inconsistencies in the pattern of information loss: high-SER items are more likely to lose visual 
information than low-SER items.  Nonetheless, mean visual strength was slightly higher for 
high-SER items (M = 3.78) than low-SER items (M = 3.42).  Hence, there is a strong enough 
trend across the full SER scale for increasing visual strength to reliably predict an increase in 
SER, but it is not robust enough to emerge at separate ends of the scale.  There is also 
inconsistency from one end to another of the SER scale regarding the olfactory modality, where 
the relationship was present for high SER but not for low SER.  A rise in olfactory strength does 
not necessarily increase SER while sensory experience is considered relatively weak, but the 
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same rise in olfactory strength does increase SER at the relatively strong end of the scale.  For 
example, lush, damp, and waste steadily increase in olfactory strength (3.00, 3.14, 3.53, 
respectively), but their SER is weak and undifferentiated (2.55, 2.50, 2.50).  In contrast, grass, 
body, and dirty also have increasing olfactory strength (3.06, 3.35, 3.52), but this time their SER 
is strong and follows the same increasing trend (4.08, 4.30, 5.09). We believe that these 
distortions likely result from the relative salience and strength of individual modalities during 
perceptual experience. At the low end of the SER scale, olfactory strength correlates more 
closely with other perceptual modalities than it does at the high end of the SER scale3. Since 
olfactory strength is rarely the dominant modality in a concept (Lynott & Connell, 2013), it is 
more likely to be distorted by stronger, more salient modalities with which it shares variance 
than to act as a distorter in its own right. Hence, even when collinearity is low, inter-modality 
overlap in perceptual experience weakens the ability of olfactory strength to contribute 
independently to SER at the low end of the scale, while it retains sufficient independent variance 
to act as a predictor of SER at the high end of the scale.  
These findings suggest that people are unable to provide a single rating that accurately 
reflects the full range of sensory experience involved in a perceptual simulation; that is, 
transferring a representation from unconscious simulation to conscious imagery causes some 
aspects – particularly sound, taste, and touch – to be neglected or distorted. People are not aware 
of everything they are simulating because bringing it to awareness involves systematic loss of 
information. 
Study 2: Dominance-Ordered Modalities 
Study 1 shows that people neglect or distort information from particular modalities when 
                                                            
3 See zero-order correlations in supplementary materials 
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attempting to inspect a perceptual simulation in order to produce an overall rating of sensory 
experience.  However, it is possible that the relatively poor match between modality-specific 
perceptual strength and SER emerges because people prioritise the strongest (i.e., most 
dominant) modalities in each simulation when they are asked to inspect perceptual content.  That 
is, people may be able to use a loss-minimising modality dominance strategy whereby they 
attend to the strongest, most dominant modality in a perceptual simulation quite easily, and then 
attend to the second-strongest modality, and so on, but will stop when any modality is too weak 
to be worth considering.  Since most concepts are very weak in at least one modality (Lynott & 
Connell, 2009, 2013; see Table 1 for examples), inspection of a simulation would therefore 
usually cease before all five modalities had been taken into account.  Such a strategy would 
effectively result in minimal information loss, but could produce the impression that certain 
modalities (i.e., auditory, gustatory, haptic) are habitually neglected if they frequently feature in 
the weakest, least-dominant positions.  In the present study, we examine this possibility. 
Rather than examine perceptual strength across five individual modalities, we rank-
ordered the ratings for each word from maximum perceptual strength (i.e., the most dominant 
modality) to minimum perceptual strength (i.e., the least dominant modality), and compared 
these dominance-ordered perceptual strength ratings to SER.  If the above possibility is correct, 
and perceptual simulations can be easily transferred to conscious imagery without (much) 
information loss by prioritising dominant information, then people should be able to rate the 
extent to which a word evokes a perceptual experience in its most dominant modalities.  That is, 
dominance-ordered perceptual strength and SER would be closely related, with the importance 
of each relationship to SER decreasing systematically from most to least dominant modality (i.e., 
the strongest positive relationship between SER and maximum perceptual strength, followed by 
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second-to-maximum perceptual strength, etc.), and doing so consistently (i.e., same order of 
relationships at low and high ends of SER scale).   
However, if people are not using such a modality dominance strategy, and perceptual 
information is inevitably lost when transferred to conscious imagery, then the information loss 
we observed in Study 1 will reappear in the present study.  In this case, dominance-ordered 
perceptual strength and SER will diverge, with no systematic order of importance from most- to 
least-dominant modality in terms of their relationship to SER.  People will still neglect 
perceptual information (i.e., no positive relationship between highly-dominant modalities and 
SER), and/or distort it (i.e., relationships appearing and disappearing from one end of the SER 
scale to the other), regardless of its dominance in the referent concept’s simulation. 
Method 
Our methodology was the same as Study 1, with the exception that perceptual strength 
ratings were rank-ordered from maximum (first-most dominant) to minimum (fifth-most 
dominant) on a per-item basis.  For example, the modality-specific profile of scarf (auditory 
0.29, gustatory 0.00, haptic 4.26, olfactory 0.65, visual 4.48) was transformed to the dominance-
ordered profile of first-dominant 4.48, second-dominant 4.26, third-dominant 0.65, fourth-
dominant 0.29, fifth-dominant 0.00. 
Independent predictors were therefore five variables of dominance-ordered perceptual 
strength ratings (first-dominant, second-dominant, third-dominant, fourth-dominant, fifth-
dominant).  Table 4 shows zero-order correlations. 
Results and Discussion 
Analysis of the full SER scale showed that dominance-ordered perceptual strength 
accounted for a moderately low proportion of variance in SER (R2 = .219, adjusted R2 = .212, 
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F(5, 548) = 30.80, p < .0001).  This level of shared variance (22%) is more than that produced by 
modality-specific perceptual strength in Study 1 (13%), which suggests that people are more 
likely to rely on dominant perceptual information when evaluating sensory experience than move 
through each modality systematically. However, as in Study 1, examining the contribution of 
each predictor showed that dominance-ordered perceptual strength diverged from SER in both 
the order of importance4 (i.e., not ordered from most to least dominant modality) and direction of 
relationship (see Table 5).  The most dominant modality was most strongly related to SER, but, 
contrary to a modality dominance strategy, the second most important predictor was actually the 
fourth-dominant modality.  Next came the least dominant and second-dominant modalities, both 
of which were negatively related to SER instead of the expected positive relationship.  Lastly 
came the third-dominant modality, which was positive but only marginally significant.  
Collinearity was higher than in Study 1, but not high enough to be a problem: all VIFs < 3.9.  
Overall, perceptual information shows no systematic order of importance from most to least 
dominant modality in how it contributes to SER, meaning that some information – not related to 
                                                            
4  We chose to order the relative importance of predictors by effect size (partial-r) rather 
than by standardized coefficients because the second-dominant and least-dominant modalities 
have negative coefficients despite their positive zero-order correlations. As such, they act to 
enhance the effect of the other modalities by suppressing their unhelpful error variance (Cohen, 
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003), and so their standardised coefficients reflect their moderation of 
other modalities moreso than their direct contribution to SER.  In contrast, partial-r reflects how 
much each predictor contributes to SER when the effects of the other modalities have been 
removed from both the predictor in question and SER itself, which is more useful to our present 
purposes. 
INFORMATION LOSS FROM SIMULATION TO IMAGERY 16 
 
 
its dominance in a particular simulation – is being lost. 
Analysis of the median-split SER scale produced inconsistencies between low- and high-
SER in terms of their relationship with dominance-ordered perceptual strength.  Low SER was 
not reliably related to perceptual strength, regardless of dominance: R2 = .027, adjusted R2 = 
.009, F(5, 270) = 1.51, p = .187. As shown in Figure 2, none of the predictors, not even the most 
dominant modality, reliably predicted low SER (all ps > .14). High SER was better fit by 
dominance-ordered perceptual strength (R2 = .098, adjusted R2 = .081, F(5, 272) = 5.90, p < 
.0001) but, as for the full scale, some predictors produced negative and null relationships.  
Specifically (see Figure 2), only the most dominant modality contributed positively to SER 
(partial r = .234, β = 0.234, t(272) = 3.96, p < .0001), second-dominant strength again had a 
negative effect (partial r = –.162, β = –0.191, t(272) = –2.71, p = .007), third-dominant was 
marginally positive (partial r = .102, β = 0.168, t(272) = 1.69, p = .092), and the remaining 
variables did not contribute significantly (ps > .27).  It therefore appears that, as found for 
modality-specific perceptual information in Study 1, dominance-ordered perceptual information 
is subject to distortion when brought to conscious awareness, with even the most dominant 
modalities in a concept’s representation having different effects at the low and high ends of the 
SER scale. 
In summary, people seem to rely in part on the strongest, most dominant modality when 
transferring a simulation to conscious imagery in working memory, but do not consistently 
employ a modality dominance strategy.  Some modalities had a null relationship with SER rather 
than the positive one that would be expected if people were accurately evaluating perceptual 
imagery: only the strongest and fourth-strongest modalities actually increased SER.  Moreover, 
the second-strongest and weakest modalities are arguably misinterpreted, rather than simply 
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neglected, by having a negative relationship with SER.  In order to explore this issue further, we 
conducted a stepwise regression of the full SER scale, in which we entered each dominance-
ordered modality in turn in separate steps, and observed when negative relationships first 
appeared.  Results (see supplementary materials) showed that the second-dominant modality was 
a nonsignificant predictor when first entered in the model alongside the most-dominant modality, 
and then became an increasingly stronger suppressor (i.e., negative coefficient) as the third-
dominant and subsequent modalities were entered.  This pattern of results suggests that 
simultaneously considering two modalities leads to information being neglected, but 
simultaneously considering three or more modalities leads to outright distortion of information.  
For multimodal concepts, information from the second most dominant modality is not only lost, 
but detrimentally affects people’s ability to reliably gauge the extent of perceptual experience in 
the strongest, most dominant modality.  Based on these findings, we speculate that increasing the 
number of strong modalities in a concept increases the difficulty of transferring perceptual 
information from unconscious simulation to conscious awareness in the SER rating task.  
Negative relationships – namely those for the second-dominant (and fifth-dominant) modalities – 
are effectively an index of the difficulty of selecting a salient subset of perceptual information to 
fit in working memory.  Unimodal concepts can be consciously evaluated with relatively little 
information loss because a single dominant modality places the least strain on working memory.  
Bimodal concepts suffer information neglect because the presence of a second strong modality 
strains working memory and leads to it being ignored in favour of the dominant modality.  
Finally, multimodal concepts suffer information distortion because the presence of three or more 
strong modalities places a significant strain on working memory and leads to confusion because 
people can neither successfully ignore nor incorporate so much perceptual information. 
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All in all, these findings support the conclusion of Study 1 that people are unable to 
evaluate the full range of sensory experience unless attention is drawn to each modality 
individually. That is, people are effectively unaware of what they are simulating, and lose 
information from their perceptual simulations when attempting conscious inspection.  Moreover, 
it appears that perceptually complex concepts, where two or more modalities are strongly 
dominant in a simulation, are more difficult to examine and more prone to information loss than 
perceptually simple concepts where a single modality dominates. 
Study 3: Lexical Decision 
Although Studies 1-2 showed that people systematically lose information from various 
modalities when attempting to evaluate sensory experience as a whole, how can we be sure that 
this information loss is the result of bringing an unconscious perceptual simulation to conscious 
awareness?  It could be argued that people generate and manipulate a qualitatively different type 
of conceptual representation when asked to provide a rating compared to when implicitly 
accessing meaning during typical language processing.  That is, even though our earlier studies 
were based on the assumption that perceptual imagery is a conscious subset of unconscious 
perceptual simulation (Barsalou, 2009; Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009), perhaps this assumption was 
incorrect and these two types of perceptual representation are very different in content and 
process.  In such a case, both perceptual strength and SER would suffer from the same problem, 
because neither type of semantic variable would be capable of tapping into the unconscious 
perceptual simulation that is automatically accessed as word meaning, and instead would reflect 
a different form of perceptual imagery that was specifically and deliberately created for the 
rating task.  In this final study, we aimed to compare the ability of the variables examined in 
Studies 1-2 to predict lexical decision performance, a task whose semantic effects emerge from 
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automatic access to the full potential of unconscious perceptual simulation (Connell & Lynott, 
2014a, in press; Juhasz et al., 2011). 
Deciding whether or not a letter string constitutes a valid word is facilitated by the 
perceptual semantics of the referent concept: that is, strongly perceptual words are recognized 
more quickly than weakly perceptual words (Connell & Lynott, 2012, 2014a, in press; Juhasz et 
al., 2011; Juhasz & Yap, 2013; see also Paivio, 1986).  If the perceptual content rated during 
conscious imagery is different to the perceptual content accessed during unconscious simulation 
of meaning, then both perceptual strength and SER would account for approximately equal 
variance in lexical decision performance because they each represent a qualitatively different 
construct from the unconscious perceptual simulation that underlies semantic effects in word 
recognition.  In other words, both ratings scales would predict useful, but incomplete semantic 
effects because they both capture a useful, but imperfect overlap of the possible sensory 
information in an unconscious perceptual simulation. 
But if our earlier assumption was correct, and the information loss we found in Studies 1-
2 occurred because of difficulties in bringing a multimodal perceptual simulation to conscious 
imagery, then this information loss will carry over into the present study in the form of 
differential effects for SER and perceptual strength.  In this case, perceptual strength will 
outperform SER in explaining semantic effects in lexical decision because it represents a “truer” 
(i.e., less prone to neglect and distortion) transfer of perceptual information from unconscious to 
conscious awareness.  That is, both ratings scales would tap into a qualitatively identical 
perceptual simulation to that which is automatically accessed during word processing, but SER 
loses some of this information (i.e., particularly from auditory, gustatory and haptic modalities) 
in a way that perceptual strength does not, and hence is less able than perceptual strength to 
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predict semantic effects in lexical decision. 
Method 
Materials.  Since SER norms were collected from speakers of American English, and 
perceptual strength norms from speakers of British English, we utilised lexical decision data 
from both American and British English speakers so as not to offer one rating method an unfair 
predictive advantage.  To that end, lexical decision response times (RT), standardized response 
times with individual variance removed (zRT), and accuracy (Acc), were taken for American 
English from the English Lexicon Project (Elexicon: Balota et al., 2007) and for British English 
from the British Lexicon Project (BLP: Keuleers, Lacey, Rastle, & Brysbaert, 2012).  Of the 
materials used in Studies 1-2, 546 words had available data in Elexicon and 521 in the BLP.  
Elexicon also provided lexical variables to act as predictors, as described below.  It should be 
noted that, while this study draws on publicly-available datasets, the analyses – and hypotheses – 
in this study are new5.   Table 6 shows zero-order correlations. 
Design and analysis.  For each dependent variable (RT, zRT, and Acc for each of 
Elexicon and BLP data), we ran hierarchical linear regression analyses to determine the 
                                                            
5  Connell & Lynott (2012, 2014a) previously showed that perceptual strength 
predicts lexical decision times and accuracy from Elexicon, but for a different set of items that 
only partly overlap with the current set; perceptual strength has not previously been examined 
with BLP data, nor compared to SER. Similarly, SER has been used to predict lexical decision 
times from Elexicon (Juhasz & Yap, 2013), and lexical decision time and accuracy from the BLP 
(Juhasz et al., 2011), but these analyses were for different (partially overlapping) set of items; 
SER has not been examined with lexical decision accuracy from Elexicon, nor has performance 
been contrasted with perceptual strength.  
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proportion of variance each candidate rating could explain.  Step 1 entered lexical predictors that 
commonly contribute to lexical decision performance: log SUBTLEXus word frequency, length 
in letters, orthographic neighborhood size, and phonological neighborhood size.  Step 2 entered 
either SER or maximum perceptual strength (i.e., the highest of the five modality-specific 
ratings, representing perceptual strength in the concept’s dominant modality).  We utilized 
maximum perceptual strength, rather than individual ratings in separate modalities, because it 
was previously shown to be an effective predictor of lexical decision data (Connell & Lynott, 
2012) and because, as a single variable, it offered a fair statistical comparison with SER.  
Furthermore, it allowed us to conduct the following step in the hierarchical regression without 
overinflating the number of predictors. Step 3 entered the interaction between log word 
frequency and the rating entered in the previous step (i.e., SER or maximum perceptual strength), 
which was calculated using centered values for each variable.  Since semantic effects are 
typically stronger for low-frequency words than high-frequency words (e.g., James, 1975; Kroll 
& Merves, 1986), entering the interaction term allows a full picture to emerge of how much 
variance in lexical decision performance can be explained by each candidate rating, which has 
not been examined in previous studies. Confidence intervals (95%) for partial correlations were 
bootstrapped over 1000 samples from a pseudo-random seed. 
Finally, for each of the six regression models, we compared the relative predictive ability 
of SER versus maximum perceptual strength in an Hotelling-Williams test (Steiger, 1980) on the 
total improvement in fit between Step 1 and Step 3, using Holm's (1979) Bonferroni corrections 
for multiple comparisons; that is, we tested whether SER (plus its interaction with frequency) 
accounted for a significantly different proportion of variance than maximum perceptual strength 
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(plus its interaction with frequency).6  In addition, we compared the fit of the data under SER 
and maximum perceptual strength by estimating Bayes Factor based on the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) for each of the SER and perceptual strength models at Step 3 (Kass & Raftery, 
1995; Wagenmakers, 2007). 
Results and Discussion 
Table 7 reports the change in fit at each step of each regression model and Table 8 
contains the partial correlations and coefficients of the semantic predictors (see supplementary 
materials for additional statistics).  Both SER and maximum perceptual strength facilitated 
lexical decision latency and accuracy in Elexicon and BLP samples (although SER was not a 
reliable predictor of BLP latency).  However, the variables did not interact with frequency to the 
same extent.  Perceptual strength affected low-frequency words more than high-frequency words 
for both latency and accuracy.  SER had this effect for accuracy alone.  Collinearity for 
predictors and their interaction terms was low (VIFs < 1.3). 
Critically, when examining relative predictive ability, the total semantic effect of 
perceptual strength (1.7-5.2% variance) consistently accounted for more variance in lexical 
decision performance than did that of SER (0.2-3.7% variance: see Figure 3).  In the Elexicon 
dataset, perceptual strength (and its frequency interaction) increased model fit more than did 
SER (and its frequency interaction) in RT, t(543) = 2.50, p = .025; zRT, t(543) = 7.34, p < .001; 
                                                            
6  Since multiple regression is essentially a Pearson correlation between obtained 
and predicted dependent variables, the Hotelling-Williams test can be used to compare two 
regression models that share a dependent variable (i.e., non-nested model comparison) by 
including the correlation between the predicted values of each model (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). 
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and Acc, t(543) = 2.00, p = .046.  The same pattern appeared in the BLP dataset for RT, t(518) = 
13.02, p < .001; zRT, t(518) = 12.69, p < .001; and Acc, t(518) = 4.19, p < .001.  Model 
comparisons using Bayes Factors (BF: see Table 9) confirmed that, in all cases, the data were in 
favour of maximum perceptual strength over SER.  On average, the data were several thousand 
times more likely (mean BF = 4586) to occur under a model including maximum perceptual 
strength (and its frequency interaction) than a model including SER (and its frequency 
interaction).  To put these values in context, any BF > 150 is typically interpreted as constituting 
very strong evidence (Kass & Raftery, 1995; Wagenmakers, 2007). 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that the above non-nested model comparisons are 
concerned with a relatively small difference in predictive ability, and that a more conservative 
test would be to examine whether maximum perceptual strength can explain variance in lexical 
decision performance over and above SER7.   We therefore subjected the SER models to two 
additional hierarchical steps: Step 4 entered maximum perceptual strength, whereas Step 5 
entered the interaction between log word frequency and maximum perceptual strength.  We then 
examined whether there was a significant increase in R2 between Step 3 (i.e., the SER model) 
and Step 5 (i.e., the model with maximum perceptual strength in addition to SER).  Results (see 
Tables 7 and 10) showed that perceptual strength explained 1.2-2.7% unique variance above and 
beyond SER in all models.  Collinearity amongst semantic predictors was again low (VIFs < 
1.3).  That is, even when SER has already been taken into account, maximum perceptual strength 
still predicts lexical decision performance, which is consistent with the idea that perceptual 
strength contains useful information that has been lost to SER. 
Results show that semantic effects in lexical decision, a task in which semantic access is 
                                                            
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 
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automatic and unconscious, are better predicted by the maximum modality-specific rating of 
perceptual strength than the overall rating of SER.  Specifically, perceptual strength explains an 
average of 2.6% of lexical decision variance, more than twice what SER explains at 1.2%. 
Although such values may seem numerically small, the 2.6% effect size of perceptual strength 
(and, indeed, the 1.4% advantage of perceptual strength over SER) is larger than that of many 
other theoretically important semantic variables on lexical decision, such as that of imageability 
(0.3-2.5%: Connell & Lynott, 2012; Pexman et al., 2008), number of semantic features (1.3%: 
Pexman et al., 2008), or affective valence and arousal (2.0% and 0.1%, respectively: Kuperman 
et al., 2014).  In other words, the differences in informational content between perceptual 
strength and SER that we observed in Studies 1-2 have a direct behavioural consequence.  Our 
findings suggest that conscious imagery during a rating task and unconscious semantic access 
during word processing are both accessing the same perceptual information, rather than imagery 
requiring the construction of a qualitatively different conceptual representation. SER involved 
the loss of some perceptual information relative to perceptual strength, and hence SER can 
explain less variance in lexical decision performance.  Because perceptual strength requires 
attending to each modality individually, it represents a somewhat more complete or accurate 
transfer of perceptual information from unconscious to conscious awareness, and therefore does 
better in predicting lexical decision performance. As such, the present study supports our earlier 
conclusions from Studies 1-2: people cannot reliably move perceptual information from 
unconscious to conscious awareness because inspecting a simulation tends to involve 
information loss. 
General Discussion 
We investigated whether it is possible to be aware of what one is mentally representing; 
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that is, whether it is possible to consciously examine the contents of a perceptual simulation 
without losing information.  Results of Study 1 showed that people are unable to reliably rate the 
true extent to which a concept is based on sensory experience (i.e., the perceptual content of a 
simulation), and neglect and distort some aspects of their simulation unless their attention is 
explicitly drawn to them.  Specifically, when comparing ratings of perceptual strength in five 
separate modalities with an overall rating of sensory experience (SER), we found that SER was 
unrelated to auditory, gustatory and haptic experience, and inconsistently related to olfactory and 
visual experience, meaning that information from these modalities is lost when deliberately 
examining a simulation by generating conscious imagery. Additionally, when we ordered the 
modality ratings for each word by dominance, we found in Study 2 that the most dominant 
modality was most strongly related to SER, but the second-dominant modality was negatively 
related, which suggests that information loss is more pervasive for complex, multimodal 
simulations.  Finally, in Study 3, we investigated whether such information loss really resulted 
from the transfer of perceptual information from unconscious to conscious awareness, rather than 
from a qualitative difference in the representations created for rating tasks versus unconscious 
simulation of meaning.  Results showed that maximum perceptual strength (i.e., the dominant 
modality) consistently outperformed SER in accounting for variance in lexical decision 
performance, a task whose semantic effects emerge from automatic access to the full potential of 
unconscious perceptual simulation. The information loss observed in Studies 1-2 therefore 
results from the differential ability of perceptual strength and SER to transfer a perceptual 
simulation to conscious imagery.  Together, the present findings suggest that people cannot be 
aware of everything they are simulating because the act of bringing it to awareness leads to 
systematic loss of information. 
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So why does information loss occur? We suggest that the limited capacity of working 
memory is mainly responsible: because the full representational content of a perceptual 
simulation is more than can be held in working memory at once, something has to go.  In the 
same way that we cannot attend to all aspects of ongoing perceptual experience, we cannot 
attend to all aspects of a perceptual simulation.  It does not mean that the unattended perceptual 
experience or simulation is not present, but rather means that we do not devote any working 
memory resources to its processing, and so it is lost to conscious awareness.  Nonetheless, 
information is not lost arbitrarily.  When people attempt to bring simulation content to conscious 
awareness as imagery, the working memory buffer does not have to hold the entire panoply of 
perceptual information all in one go.  Rather, as the plot of a novel or the gist of a conversation 
can be represented with only the most relevant aspects active in working memory at any one time 
(e.g., Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Zwaan, 2004), the full perceptual (and motor, affective, etc.) 
experience underlying word meaning can be unconsciously simulated with only the most 
relevant subset of information (e.g., a single modality) active in working memory.  For SER, all 
perceptual content must be examined to provide a single rating, which means that the subset of 
perceptual information that makes it to working memory as conscious imagery tends to skip over 
information from some modalities (particularly sound, taste and touch) and distort information 
from other modalities (particularly sight and smell).  For perceptual strength ratings, however, 
each modality is examined and rated in turn, and so the subset of perceptual information that 
makes it to working memory can encompass a significant amount of auditory information for the 
auditory rating, which is then replaced by gustatory information for the gustatory rating, and so 
on until a relatively broad range of information from each modality has been considered.  It is 
unlikely that all perceptual information from each modality can be represented and inspected in 
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this way, but the results of Study 3 and other related research (Connell & Lynott, 2012; 2014a) 
suggests that a useful amount of information from each modality does make it through. 
The question then arises of what makes information relevant. If the most relevant 
information makes it to working memory when people attempt to inspect a perceptual 
simulation, what is it about auditory, haptic, and gustatory content that makes it less useful than 
visual or olfactory content?  One possibility is that regularities within multimodal experience can 
offer an heuristic as to what information can be most safely jettisoned. Previous research has 
shown that visual and haptic experience tends to correlate, as does olfactory and gustatory 
experience, while auditory experience stands alone (Louwerse & Connell, 2011; Lynott & 
Connell, 2009, 2013; van Dantzig, Cowell, Zeelenberg & Pecher, 2011; see also Table 2).  Many 
aspects of visual experience, such as colours and patterns, have no haptic counterpart, but the 
reverse is true far less often (i.e., that which can be touched can usually be seen).  In that respect, 
attending to vision and ignoring touch might be a reasonable heuristic to employ when 
representational capacity is limited.  This idea is consistent with a more general tactile 
disadvantage found in both perception (Spence, Nicholls, & Driver, 2001; Turatto, Galfano, 
Bridgeman, & Umiltà, 2004) and conceptual processing (Connell & Lynott, 2010), whereby 
anticipated touch information is the slowest to detect, and most prone to error, of all the 
perceptual modalities.  Similarly, there are some aspects of olfactory experience that are not 
tasted, such as perfumes, but gustatory and olfactory modalities are largely engaged together in 
experience of foods and flavours (i.e., that which can be tasted can usually be smelled).  Hence, 
attending to olfaction and ignoring taste might be a reasonable heuristic to maximise information 
capture.  Auditory experience, however, is different.  It is not systematically related to other 
forms of perceptual experience; indeed, ratings of auditory strength tend to correlate negatively 
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with perceptual strength in other modalities (e.g., Table 2; Lynott & Connell, 2009, 2013; van 
Dantzig et al., 2011).  Strongly-auditory concepts also tend to have the highest modality 
exclusivity (i.e., more likely to be perceived through a single modality: Lynott & Connell, 2009, 
2013).  That which can be heard is not necessarily perceptible through another modality (e.g., 
echo, rhyme), and that which can be seen, touched, smelled or tasted often produces no sound 
(e.g., steak, warm).  It is perhaps this singularity that makes auditory information less useful than 
the visual/haptic or olfactory/gustatory clusters of perceptual experience, and susceptible to 
neglect unless attention is specifically drawn to it. The fact that adults tend to discard auditory 
information in a way that children do not (Sloutsky & Napolitano, 2003) supports the notion of a 
learned heuristic underlying auditory information loss.  
The information loss we observed in the present studies is unlikely to be a unique feature 
of rating tasks, and we would expect it to generalize to a range of circumstances that require 
people to inspect or evaluate some aspect of a simulation.  The ease of generating perceptual 
imagery for a word (i.e., imageability) and the extent of perceptual experience evoked by a word 
(i.e., SER) are moderately well correlated at r = .586 (Juhasz & Yap, 2012), suggesting that they 
reflect related, but different, judgements regarding the perceptual basis of concepts.  However, 
they are subject to the same pattern of information loss (Study 1; Connell & Lynott, 2012), with 
both tending to neglect and/or distort the auditory, haptic, and gustatory modalities more than 
vision or olfaction. Hence, it seems that SER and imageability ratings both lose information in 
the same way when attempting to transfer a conceptual representation from automatic, 
unconscious simulation to conscious imagery, and differ in the decision processes made on that 
information (i.e., rating the extent of sensory imagery versus ease of generating sensory 
imagery).  It is therefore likely that any process that requires the conscious inspection of 
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conceptual representations (or at least of their perceptual aspects) will be susceptible to the same 
information loss.  It bears further investigation to determine how widespread is the tendency to 
lose sensory information from sound, touch, and taste in other cognitive tasks such as semantic 
similarity judgements or autobiographical recall.   
An older tradition in cognitive research has viewed semantics and mental representation 
in terms of the architectures and structures that allowed symbols to be manipulated (e.g., Collins 
& Quillian, 1968; Pylyshyn, 1984; see Meteyard, Rodriguez Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 
2012, for review).  The representational content of those symbols was unimportant to their 
function, as they were divorced from the sensory and motor systems through which they were 
originally learned.  In the last few years, the consensus has shifted to viewing semantics and 
mental representation – and cognition more broadly – in terms of the sensory and motor systems 
that produce emergent structures through simulations of experience (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; 
Connell & Lynott, 2014b; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Vigliocco et al., 2009).  Here, the 
representational content of simulations is essential to their function, as they remain grounded in 
the sensory and motor systems that host the simulation.  Critically, they still permit manipulation 
in “symbolic” operations (Barsalou, 2008).  Our findings in the present paper show that there are 
systematic patterns in how perceptual information is lost when such simulated content must 
move to finite-capacity working memory in order to be to be manipulated.  Future research 
should determine how non-perceptual aspects of simulations, such as motor or affective 
information, may also be subject to loss when conscious inspection is required. 
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Sample words from Studies 1-2 with ratings of sensory experience (SER) and modality-specific 
perceptual strength. Maximum perceptual strength in the dominant modality is shown in bold. 
Word SER Perceptual strength 
Auditory Gustatory Haptic Olfactory Visual 
Consistent SER and perceptual strength 
factor 1.91 1.31 0.37 0.31 0.06 1.87 
breath 3.70 2.18 2.18 1.71 3.00 1.71 
sword 4.18 1.23 0.00 2.71 0.00 3.84 
baby 5.40 4.24 0.82 3.65 3.12 4.88 
music 6.00 4.94 0.00 1.24 0.06 2.24 
Inconsistent SER and perceptual strength 
pat 1.64 2.12 0.12 4.29 0.06 3.06 
small 1.80 0.43 0.00 3.67 0.00 4.95 
rhyme 2.00 4.68 0.03 0.00 1.84 0.65 
bland 3.00 0.81 4.81 0.43 3.62 2.10 
heaven 4.00 1.76 0.59 0.88 0.82 1.53 
Note: SER ranges from 1-7, perceptual strength ratings from 0-5. 
 
  




Zero-order correlations, with means and standard deviations, for sensory experience ratings 
(SER) and modality-specific perceptual strength in Study 1 (N = 554). 
Rating SER Auditory Gustatory Haptic Olfactory Visual 
SER -      
Auditory –.023   -     
Gustatory .235 –.103 -    
Haptic .155 –.276 .180 -   
Olfactory .316 –.005 .691 .212 -  
Visual .205 –.243 –.049   .421 .147 - 
M 3.03 1.76 0.59 2.05 0.76 3.60 
SD 0.99 1.23 1.00 1.31 0.94 0.87 
Note: SER ranges from 1-7, perceptual strength ratings from 0-5.  ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
  




Standardized coefficients, and partial correlations with associated 95% confidence intervals, for 
each modality of perceptual strength as a predictor of sensory experience ratings (SER) in Study 
1. 
Modality β Partial-r 95% CI (partial-r) t(548) p 
Auditory 0.04 .037 [–.060, .134] 0.88 .381 
Gustatory 0.09 .064 [–.029, .145] 1.50 .134 
Haptic 0.03 .027 [–.063, .123] 0.63 .527 
Olfactory 0.22 .164 [.078, .254] 3.89 <.001   








Zero-order correlations, with means and standard deviations, for sensory experience ratings 
(SER) and dominance-ordered modalities of perceptual strength from most dominant (1st) to 
least dominant (5th) in Study 2 (N = 554). 
Rating SER 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
SER -      
1st dominant .419 -     
2nd dominant .176 .390 -    
3rd dominant .222 .163 .505 -   
4th dominant .231 .172 .412 .750 -  
5th dominant .076 .030 .251 .557 .763 - 
M 3.03 3.85 2.63 1.31 .065 0.32 
SD 0.99 .076 1.00 0.88 0.70 0.45 








Standardized coefficients, and partial correlations with associated 95% confidence intervals, for 
each dominance-ordered modality of perceptual strength as a predictor of sensory experience 
ratings (SER) in Study 2. 
Dominance-ordered 
modality 
β Partial r 95% CI (partial-r) t(548) p 
Most dominant 0.40 .383 [.310, .457] 9.71 <.001 
Second-dominant –0.10 –.088 [–.179, –.002] –2.06 .040 
Third-dominant 0.12 .082 [–.016, .172] 1.93 .054 
Fourth-dominant 0.23 .132 [.040, .218] 3.11 .002 








Zero-order correlations for variables in Study 3's regressions of lexical decision response times 
(RT), standardized response times (zRT), and accuracy (Acc) from Elexicon (N = 546) and 
British Lexicon Project (BLP: N = 521). 
Rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Log word frequency -        
2. Length in letters –.150 -       
3. Orthographic neighbours   .195 –.706 -      
4. Phonological neighbours   .164 –.630   .727 -     
5. SER   .021   .173 –.186 –.182 -    
6. SER × log word frequency –.105 –.024 –.043   .029 –.024 -   
7. Maximum perceptual 
strength  
  .101 –.055   .024 –.015   .425 .018 -  
8. Maximum perceptual 
strength  × log word 
frequency 
–.050 –.004 –.047   .017   .017 .438 .068 - 
Elexicon RT –.583 .237 –.187 –.162 –.094 .019 –.198 .048 
Elexicon zRT –.651 .239 –.212 –.164 –.067 .074 –.184 .101 
Elexicon Acc .475 .032 .043 –.023 .162 –.200 .169 –.215 
BLP RT –.671 .135 –.137 –.048 –.049 .063 –.192 .095 
BLP zRT –.676 .132 –.130 –.036 –.067 .069 –.214 .103 
BLP Acc .461 .116 –.027 –.123 .139 –.127 .136 –.188 
Note: Interaction terms were created from centered variables.  Inter-predictor correlations are for 
the larger Elexicon dataset; those for the BLP dataset differed little (see supplementary 
materials). 
  




Changes in model fit for each step of Study 3's hierarchical regressions of lexical decision 
response times (RT), standardized response times (zRT), and accuracy (Acc), from Elexicon and 
British Lexicon Project (BLP).  
Predictor Elexicon BLP 
RT zRT Acc RT zRT Acc 
R2 Step 1 (basic model) .365*** .446*** .243*** .463*** .472*** .262*** 
Perceptual strength model 
ΔR2 Step 2 (perceptual 
strength) 
.017*** .012** .015*** .015*** .020*** .009* 
ΔR2 Step 3 (perceptual 
strength × frequency) 
.001 .006* .038*** .002  .003† .021*** 
R2 Step 3 (total effect 
model) 
.383*** .464*** .295*** .480*** .495*** .292*** 
SER model 
ΔR2 Step 2 (SER) .011** .006* .018*** .001  .003†  .009* 
ΔR2 Step 3 (SER × 
frequency) 
.001 .000  .019*** .000  .000  .005† 
R2 Step 3 (total effect 
model) 
.377*** .452*** .280*** .465*** .475*** .276*** 
ΔR2 Step 4 (perceptual 
strength) 
.009** .007** .006* .014***  .018***  .004 
ΔR2 Step 5 (perceptual 
strength × frequency) 
.003 .006*  .021*** .002  .003  .016** 
R2 Step 5 (unique effect 
model) 
.389*** .466*** .307*** .481*** .495*** .295*** 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
  




Standardized coefficients, and partial correlations with associated 95% confidence intervals, for 
maximum perceptual strength and SER variables in the total effect model (Step 3) of Study 3's 
regressions of lexical decision response times (RT), standardized response times (zRT), and 
accuracy (Acc), from Elexicon and British Lexicon Project (BLP). 
Statistic per predictor Elexicon BLP 
RT zRT Acc RT zRT Acc 
Perceptual strength model 
β       
   Perceptual strength –0.136*** –0.118*** 0.136*** –0.126*** –0.147*** 0.104** 
   Perceptual strength × 
frequency 
0.033 0.079* –0.196*** 0.046 0.054† –0.146*** 
Partial r [95% CI]       



























β        
   SER –0.110** –0.079* 0.136*** –0.038 –0.054† 0.096** 
   SER × frequency –0.036 0.009 –0.139*** 0.009 0.013 –0.069† 
Partial r [95% CI]       
























Note: The larger semantic effect on low-frequency words than high-frequency words results in 
an interaction variable producing a positive coefficient in regression of response times, and a 
negative coefficient in regression of accuracy rates. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  




Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) for perceptual strength and SER models at Step 3 of Study 
3's hierarchical regressions of lexical decision response times (RT), standardized response times 
(zRT), and accuracy (Acc), from Elexicon and British Lexicon Project (BLP), along with 
estimated Bayes Factors (BF) in favour of perceptual strength over SER. 
Predictor Elexicon BLP 
RT zRT Acc RT zRT Acc 
BIC perceptual strength –219.54 –296.38 –146.74 –296.58 –311.83 –135.79 
BIC SER –214.25 –284.29 –135.24 –281.76 –291.59 –124.15 
BF (perceptual 
strength) 










Standardized coefficients, and partial correlations with associated 95% confidence intervals, for 
all semantic variables in the unique effect model (Step 5) that entered maximum perceptual 
strength on top of SER, in Study 3's regressions of lexical decision response times (RT), 
standardized response times (zRT), and accuracy (Acc), from Elexicon and British Lexicon 
Project (BLP). 
Statistic per predictor Elexicon BLP 
RT zRT Acc RT zRT Acc 
β       
   SER –0.063 –0.036 0.098* 0.020 0.011 0.066 
   SER × frequency –0.056 –0.026 –0.072† –0.010 –0.008 –0.008 
   Perceptual strength –0.109** –0.102** 0.096* –0.134*** –0.152*** 0.075† 
   Perceptual strength × 
frequency 
0.056 0.089* –0.164*** 0.050 0.058 –0.142*** 
Partial r [95% CI]       


















































Note: The larger semantic effect on low-frequency words than high-frequency words results in 
an interaction variable producing a positive coefficient in regression of response times, and a 
negative coefficient in regression of accuracy rates. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
  




Figure 1.  Partial correlations for (Aud)itory, (Gus)tatory, (Hap)tic, (Olf)actory, and (Vis)ual 
modalities of perceptual strength, with 95% CI, as predictors of sensory experience ratings 
(SER) at the high-SER and low-SER ends of the scale (Study 1). ** p < .01 
 
  




Figure 2.  Partial correlations for dominance-ordered modalities of perceptual strength from 
most dominant (1st) to least dominant (5th), with 95% CI, as predictors of sensory experience 
ratings (SER) at the high-SER and low-SER ends of the scale (Study 2). † p < .10, ** p < .01, 
*** p < .001 
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Figure 3.  Tot al proportion of variance explained by sensory experience ratings (SER) and 
maximum perceptual strength (including their respective interactions with word frequency), over 
and above a basic model of lexical and sublexical variables, in regressions of lexical decision 
response time (RT), standardized response time (zRT) and accuracy (Acc), from Elexicon and 
British Lexicon Project (BLP). * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 for Hotelling-Williams 
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